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Torts
By STEVEN CONNELLY*
INTRODUCTION
Kentucky's two appellate courts considered a wide variety
of tort issues during the survey year.' Four such issues pro-
vide the focus for this article. Part I examines recent develop-
ments in the application of Kentucky's injury "discovery" rule
to the statute of limitations. Tort liability of an agent for acts
which could render his principal liable is discussed in Part II.
Part III considers the current state of municipal liability, and
Part IV reanalyzes the Parker v. Redden2 rule of contributory
negligence in light of recent decisions.
I. THE "DIscovERY" RULE IN KENTUCKY
Statutes of limitations for personal injury actions tradi-
tionally begin to run when the cause of action accrues, 3 i.e.,
* J.D. 1979, University of Kentucky.
1 July 1, 1978 through June 30, 1979. Other interesting cases decided in the past
year but not discussed in this article are: Holdaway Drugs, Inc. v. Braden, 582 S.W.2d
646 (Ky. 1979) (in a defamation action it is a prejudicial error not to inform the jury
that a conditional privilege exists and that actual malice is necessary to overcome it);
Joyce v. Downs, 573 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1978) (a bicyclist has the same duty as a driver
of a car to keep a lookout to the rear even though a rearview mirror not required by
law); City of Murray v. Commonwealth, 584 S.W.2d 403 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (Ky.
REV. STAT. § 150.460 (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as KRS] imposes strict liability
on a city for discharging raw sewage into stream); Browning v. Browning, 584 S.W.2d
406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (no cause of action against a spouse who intentionally causes
emotional distress of the other spouse by "openly consorting with another party");
Commonwealth v. Burger, 578 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (the Board of Claims
has no authority under KRS § 44.070 (Supp. 1978) to make awards based on strict
liability); University of Louisville v. Martin, 574 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978)
(KRS § 273.171(2) (1970) does not permit a breach of contract action to be main-
tained against the University of Louisville since sovereign immunity extends to con-
tract actions; proper remedy lies under KRS § 44.260); Rooks v. University of Louis-
ville, 574 S.W.2d 923 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (KRS § 273.171(2) does not allow a
negligence suit to be brought against the University of Louisville other than through
the Board of Claims).
2 421 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967).
3 E.g., KRS § 413.140(1)(Supp. 1978)(actions with one year limitation). "Statutes
of limitation are based on the accrual of a right of action and, therefore, begin to run
from the time the cause or the foundation of the right came into existence . .. ."
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when the wrongful act produces injury.4 When the existence
of the injury is inherently unknowable, however, a number of
jurisdictions postpone the running of the statute until the
plaintiff discovers the injury or should have discovered it
through the use of reasonable diligence.5 Kentucky first
adopted this "discovery" rule in 1970 in Tomlinson v. Siehl.0
In April, 1979, the Kentucky Supreme Court radically re-
vised the Tomlinson discovery rule in Louisville Trust Co. v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp.7 The scope of the revised rule
is unclear but the Johns-Manville Court arguably contem-
plated a comprehensive expansion of the Tomlinson rule.
A. The Tomlinson Rule
The discovery rule was adopted in Kentucky in two
wrongful birth cases. In Tomlinson v. Siehl,8 the Tomlinsons
instituted an action against their physician for alleged negli-
gence in performing a sterilization operation. The trial court
dismissed the suit because it had been filed more than one
year after the operation. The Court of Appeals reversed, over-
ruling previous cases which had held "that causes of action
such as the present one 'accrue' on the date of operation." 9
The Court decreed that "the statute of limitations should not
begin to run until the discovery of the cause of action." 10 Ap-
plying a policy balancing analysis, the Court concluded that
the possible hardship in defending a "stale" claim, such as
lost evidence, faded memories, missing witnesses, or a chance
of fraud, was outweighed by the certain hardship the total loss
Caudill v. Arnett, 481 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Ky. 1972) (quoting Jordan v. Howard, 54
S.W.2d 613, 615 (Ky. 1932)).
" E.g., Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973) "A cause of action does not
exist until the conduct causes injury that produces loss or damage." Id. at 225.
5 According to Dean Prosser, the discovery rule is a judicial or legislative deci-
sion that a statute of limitations "will not be construed as intended to run until the
plaintiff has in fact discovered that he has suffered injury, or by the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence should have discovered it." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF ME LAW OF
TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
6 459 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1970).
7 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979).
8 459 S.W.2d at 166.
0 Id. at 167.
10 Id. (emphasis added).
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of a cause of action would work on the plaintiff. Thus the new
discovery rule would produce less injustice.11
A year later, the Court refined the Tomlinson rule in a
second wrongful birth decision. In Hackworth v. Hart,2 the
plaintiffs sued the husband's physician, alleging negligent per-
formance of a vasectomy. Again the issue centered on accrual
of the cause of action for malpractice. Narrowing the Tomlin-
son rule, the Court held "that the statute begins to run on the
date of the discovery of the injury, or from the date it should,
in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, have been
discovered.
'1 3
B. Limits on the Tomlinson Rule
By 1972 several limits had been placed on the Tomlinson
rule. First, the Kentucky General Assembly codified the dis-
covery rule in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) § 413.140(2).
The statute, while incorporating the Tomlinson rule that the
cause of action accrues on the date the injury is discovered or
in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence should have
been discovered, limited the rule's scope to actions com-
menced "within five years from the date on which the alleged
negligent act or omission is said to have occurred. 1 4 Secondly,
in Caudill v. Arnett, 5 the Court itself constricted the discov-
ery rule by narrowly defining the elements of the discovery of
an injury.
In Caudill the plaintiff, who had been injured while rid-
ing a school bus, sued the county school system more than six
years after his injury. He argued that the Tomlinson rule con-
trolled and that although he had suffered continuous pain
since the accident in 1963, he did not discover his chronic
pancreatitis until undergoing exploratory surgery in August,
1969. Since suit was filed in November, 1969, he contended
11 Id. at 168. See Comment, Medical Malpractice Statute of Limita-
tions-Adoption of the Discovery Rule, 59 Ky. L.J. 990 (1970) for a more detailed
analysis of Tomlinson.
12 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1971).
13 Id. at 379 (emphasis in original).
14 KRS § 413.140(2) (Supp. 1978).
15 481 S.W.2d 668 (Ky. 1972).
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that the action16 was timely. The trial court disagreed, ruling
that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the explora-
tory operation in 1969 did not reveal the injury, "but rather
[revealed] . . the extent of a previously recognized injury.'1
7
The Court determined that the cause of action accrued and
the statute of limitations began to run on the day Caudill was
injured because he had been aware of the injury at that time.
Although he was unaware of the full extent of the injury until
several years later, that impediment did not toll the statute.
The Court, in dicta, added that "[t]he rule of Tomlinson is an
exception to the general rule with its application being limited
to malpractice cases."""
C. Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.
The Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Louisville
Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.19 shattered the
convenient pigeonhole that the Tomlinson rule had occupied
since 1970. The rule was no longer limited to malpractice ac-
16 Id. at 668-69.
17 Id. at 669.
18 Id. at 670. The Sixth Circuit, in Hall v. Musgrave, 517 F.2d 1163 (6th Cir.
1975), also narrowly construed Kentucky's discovery rule. In Hall, although the plain-
tiff discovered that her bladder was leaking ten days after giving birth, it was more
than a year until she learned that her injury had been caused by the defendant physi-
cian's negligence rather than the natural problems of childbirth. The plaintiff brought
a negligence action against her physician ten months after discovering the connection
but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed
the case, ruling that the action had not been filed within the one year limitation
period. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Kentucky's "discovery" rule was in-
tended to apply only until the discovery of the harmful effects of an inherently un-
knowable injury and not until the discovery of a causal connection between the injury
and the defendant's negligence. Since the plaintiff had learned of her problem ten
days after the delivery, her action had been barred more than a year before she filed
suit. 517 F.2d at 1167-68. Judge Celebrezze's dissent focused on the difference be-
tween the discovery of harm and the discovery of an injury which gives rise to a
concomitant cause of action. Under Kentucky law, he argued, the statute of limita-
tions does not begin running in malpractice actions until the plaintiff knows or
should have known that a cause of action existed against the defendant. Thus "[t]he
majority's test [violated] the basic principle of the discovery rule-that a plaintiff be
aware of the right to bring an action before that right is taken away." 517 F.2d at
1172. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7, and comments (1965).
-9 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979).
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tions, nor was it subject to the inference that the statute of
limitations period begins to run with discovery of harmful ef-
fects and not with the discovery of a cause of action.
Johns-Manville concerned a wrongful death action prose-
cuted by the administrator of William Sampson's estate
against Johns-Manville for failure to warn Sampson ade-
quately of known dangers associated with breathing asbestos
dust. Sampson was exposed to the asbestos dust for five years
while employed by the defendant. He left that position in
1967 and discovered he had lung cancer in 1971. Sampson
died the following year.
The jury awarded the plaintiff $90,000. The Kentucky
Court of Appeals reversed, relying on Columbus Mining Com-
pany v. Walke 20 and held that the cause of action accrued on
the date Sampson was last exposed. Therefore, the one year
statute of limitations had run before the action was insti-
tuted.21 The plaintiff appealed and the Kentucky Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court discarded the language in Caudill
which limited the Tomlinson rule to malpractice actions. The
Court carefully noted that the holding in Caudill was that the
plaintiff had discovered his injury at the time of the accident
and only discovered the extent of his injury later. Characteriz-
ing its statement in Caudill as "gratuitous, obiter dictum",
the Court stated that "the application of Tomlinson was irrel-
evant to the decision, '22 and overruled Columbus Mining,
thus extending the Tomlinson rule to latent disease injuries
arising from exposure to harmful substances. Thus in Johns-
Manville, the action accrued when the lung cancer was discov-
ered and not at the time of the last exposure to the dust. The
Court found no compelling policy justification for distinguish-
ing a latent disease injury from a medical malpractice injury.
In both instances, because the injury was inherently unknow-
able, the injured plaintiff could lose his cause of action before
he became aware of his right to sue.
20 271 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954).
21 For a more detailed discussion of the Court of Appeals' opinion see Cooper,
Civil Procedure, 66 Ky. L.J. 531, 534-36 (1978).
22 580 S.W.2d at 500.
1979-1980]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Finally, the Supreme Court rephrased the Tomlinson
rule, and adopted the New Hampshire approach, quoting
from Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co.: 2s
In a case, such as the one before us, in which the injury
and the discovery of the causal relationship do not occur si-
multaneously, it is important to articulate exactly what the
discovery rule means. We believe that the proper formula-
tion of the rule and the one that will cause the least confu-
sion is the one adopted by the majority of courts: A cause
of action will not accrue under the discovery rule until the
plaintiff discovers or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have discovered not only that he has been injured
but also that his injury may have been caused by the de-
fendant's conduct.2 4
The newly adopted rule is the same as the rule pro-
pounded in Tomlinson and Hackworth, except that the cause
of action accrues with the discovery of a causal connection be-
tween the plaintiff's injury and the defendant's conduct.2 '
1. Scope After Johns-Manville
Johns-Manville invites the inference that the Tomlinson
rule is not limited simply to medical malpractice or latent dis-
ease injuries. The Court specifically noted that the discovery
rule also was applicable to fraud and workmen's compensation
actions.2 Given the Court's language and that the discovery
rule clearly is applicable to these four separate causes of ac-
tion, it is arguable that the scope of the Tomlinson rule now
includes all actions where the injury and a causal connection
between the injury and a defendant's conduct is inherently
unknowable to the plaintiff when the tort is committed.
Lashlee v. Sumner,7 a Sixth Circuit decision, provides an
" 371 A.2d 170 (N.H. 1977).
24 580 S.W.2d at 501 (emphasis in original).
25 Cf. Hall v. Musgrave, 517 F.2d 1163 (6th Cir. 1975)(federal rule requires some
indication to plaintiff that injury resulted from malpractice before cause of action
accrues) (dissenting opinion).
22 580 S.W.2d at 500 (citing Cooper, Civil Procedure, 66 Ky. L.J. 531, 534-35
(1978)); See KRS § 413.139(3) (1972) (fraud); KRS § 342.316(3) (1977) (workmen's
compensation).
27 570 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1978).
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example of this argument. In Sumner, an action for libel was
brought against a psychologist who had interviewed the plain-
tiff-employee and later sent an allegedly libelous report to the
plaintiff's employer. A federal district court applying Ken-
tucky law dismissed the action for, among other reasons, fail-
ure to comply with the applicable statute of limitations. On
appeal the plaintiff argued that:
his cause of action for libel did not accrue until he learned
or should have learned of its existence ... [and that] the
injury to his relationship with his employer which resulted
from the report was inherently unknowable until its con-
tents were revealed to him and that he was blamelessly igno-
rant of the wrong which had been inflicted.
28
The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument because of the
express statement in Caudill limiting Tomlinson to malprac-
tice actions. The court noted, however, that "[i]f the highest
court of Kentucky had not limited the application of the dis-
covery rule plaintiff's argument might be persuasive. 29 Under
the rule as framed in Johns-Manville, such a libel action
might qualify for the Tomlinson treatment.
2. Limits
Although the Tomlinson rule is broad, it does have limi-
tations. The Hackworth requirement 0 that the statute of lim-
itations will not begin to run until the plaintiff in the exercise
of ordinary care and diligence should have discovered the in-
jury is still applicable. In addition, the Johns-Manville Court
did not overrule that portion of the Caudill decision holding
the Tomlinson rule inapplicable to toll the running of the
statute of limitations when only the extent of an injury re-
mains undiscovered. Furthermore, there is a maximum time
limit for the Tomlinson rule in medical malpractice,3 1 prod-
ucts liability,32 workmen's compensation,3 and fraud"' actions
28 Id. at 109.
21 Id. at 110.
20 See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra for a more detailed discussion of the
Hackworth limitation.
21 KRS § 413.140(2) (Supp. 1978).
22 KRS § 411.320(3) (Supp. 1978).
1979-19801
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by virtue of statute.
II. AGENCY CONCEPTS IN TORT LIABILITY
During the survey year, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
considered tort liability in an agency context in Carr v. Bar-
nett,35 which presented the issue of an agent's personal liabil-
ity to a third party. In Carr, Carr Co., allegedly owned by Ja-
cob Carr, contracted with Rockcastle Villa Partnership to
build a housing project. C & C Contracting Company was se-
lected as the subcontractor for the grading and drainage work
on the project. During construction, as C & C needed addi-
tional fill dirt, Jacob Carr directed C & C's foremen to remove
dirt from the plaintiffs' adjoining land.
The plaintiffs sued Jacob Carr and C & C for, among
other things, the value of the fill dirt. The circuit court
granted judgment against C & C and against Jacob Carr per-
sonally. On appeal, Carr argued that he should not have been
personally liable since he was merely acting as an agent for
Carr Co., and no judgment had been entered against it. The
court of appeals rejected his argument, concluding that Jacob
Carr had been aware of the boundary line marking the plain-
tiffs' property, that he had not been authorized to take the fill
dirt, and that the order to remove the dirt was tortious.30
The court based its decision on the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Agency 37 and Kentucky precedent. The court noted
- KRS § 342.316(3) (1977).
34 KRS § 413.130(3) (1972).
85 580 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
36 580 S.W.2d at 239.
V The court quoted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958):
An agent who does an act otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by
the fact that he acted at the command of the principal or on account of the
principal, except where he is exercising a privilege of the principal, or a
privilege held by him for the protection of the principal's interest, or where
the principal owes no duty or less than the normal duty of care to the per-
son harmed.
580 S.W.2d at 239-40.
The court also noted the comments accompanying section 343 of the
Restatement:
An agent who directs or permits conduct of another under such circum-
stances that he should realize that there is an unreasonable risk of harm to
[Vol 68
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that "an agent is personally liable for his own tortuous [sic]
acts even though performed within the scope of his employ-
ment and under conditions which impose liability upon the
principal also"3 and that "it has long been the law of this
jurisdiction that the party harmed can look for reparation
from the agent only without the necessity of proceeding
against the principal."39
Both the law and policy behind the Carr decision are well
founded. The personal liability of an agent to a third party
has long been settled.40 Few cases, however, have dealt with
others or to their belongings is subject to liability for harm resulting from a
risk which his directions or permission creates.
580 S.W.2d at 240. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 343, comment b ("agent
who enters the land of another ... is not excused by the mere fact that he is acting
as an agent"); Id. comment d ("agent who assists another agent or the principal to
commit a tort is normally himself liable as a joint tortfeasor for the entire damage");
Id. § 344 ("agent is subject to liability, as he would be for his own personal conduct,
for the consequences of another's conduct which results from his directions . . .");
Id. comment a, illustration 1 ("A, foreman of a gang of track workers, directs some of
the workers to obtain wood from a specified field which belongs to T. A is subject to
liability to T for the trespass.").
38 580 S.W.2d at 240 (citing Kentucky-Tennessee Light and Power Co. v. Nash-
ville Coal Co., 37 F. Supp. 728 (W.D. Ky. 1941)).
In Nashville Coal, one defendant, an officer of the company, made commission
payments forbidden by anti-trust laws. The defendant contended that even if a cause
of action existed against the company, none existed against him personally because
he was merely an agent.
The federal court rejected his argument, stating that well-settled principles of
agency law allowed the agent to be held personally liable along with the principal. No
Kentucky case was cited as authority, but Waller v. Martin, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 181
(1856) and cases from jurisdictions cited in Annot., 20 A.L.R. 97, 109 (1922) and An-
not., 99 A.L.R. 408 (1935) could have been used.
In Waller, the officers, engineers, and laborers of a railroad were sued for tres-
pass. The Kentucky Court held that if the company had no authority to be on the
land, the officers were individually liable. The Court said that it "is a well-settled
principle that an agent who does or causes the illegal act can not justify [the act] by
the command or authority of another who had no right to do or authorize it." 56 Ky.
at 192.
3 580 S.W.2d at 240; see Pool v. Adkisson, 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 110, 112 (1833):
The injured party has a right to look for reparation to him who was actually
and immediately employed in the act from which the injury resulted. He
may sue either the principal or accessory, the employer or employed, the
constituent or his agent; and may (generally) sue either one separately.
See also V. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 47, at 296. (4th ed. 1971):
"When joinder is permitted, it is not compelled. . . ." Id.
40 See notes 37 and 38 supra, for a more complete discussion of the authorities.
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the sole liability of an agent. Normally, the plaintiff sues the
principal for his deep pocket. However, when a corporation is
under-capitalized and the agent, often the sole shareholder,
has a deep pocket, a plaintiff can prosecute an action against
the agent alone.
The modern policy of proper loss allocation41 justifies the
personal liability of the agent in this situation since the agent
can best bear the loss and distribute the cost. In the words of
the Kentucky Court in the early case of Waller v. Martin,42
"as to the remedy against the corporation may be fruitless,
and against its agents or officers the only available one, it
would be an inadmissible conclusion to say that... there is
no remedy against individuals who have occasioned the
injury." 43
III. MUNIcmPAL LxAB.ITY
Since Kentucky abrogated municipal immunity sixteen
years ago in Haney v. City of Lexington," Kentucky's high
court has searched for a proper theory to measure that liabil-
ity. Two recent decisions, Grogan v. Commonwealth43 and
Brown v. City of Louisville,46 indicate that the issue has yet to
be resolved.
A. The Developing Theory
Over the past sixteen years, the Court has fashioned three
theories of municipal liability. Under the Haney formulation,
no distinction was drawn between individuals and municipal
corporations. Cities were to be held liable in any instance
where individuals would be liable.47 Haney did not, however,
"'broaden the government's obligation so as to make it re-
sponsible for all harms to others; it is only as to those harms
"1 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 69, at 459 (4th ed. 1971)
for a thorough discussion of loss allocation.
42 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 181 (1856).
43 Id. at 192.
44 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964).
45 577 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. 1979).
46 585 S.W.2d 428 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
47 386 S.W.2d at 742.
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which are torts that governmental bodies are to be liable by
reason of this decision.' ,,48
The Court in City of Louisville v. Louisville Seed Co.
49
retreated from the broad liability imposed by Haney, holding
that cities were not liable "[w]here the acts affects all mem-
bers of the general public alike. . . ,,10 Thus a city would not
be held liable "for a risk which is inherently part of the carry-
ing on of the function of government, such as its failure to
provide fire protection, police protection or, as here, flood pro-
tection."' 1 Only where "the city, by its dealings or activities,
seeks out or separates the individual from the general public
and deals with him on an individual basis, as any other person
might do . . . [or where] the negligent act of the city per
chance falls upon the isolated citizen" 52 would a municipality
be subjected to the same rules as are individuals.
In City of RussellUville v. Greer,53 the Court limited the
Louisville Seed Co. "singled out" theory, reshaping it to fit
tort concepts. Using traditional tort analysis, a city would be
liable only if it owed a duty to the plaintiff as an individual
and not as a member of the public. Because municipalities do
not owe a legal duty to individual members of the public to
provide fire protection, traffic regulation or perform other gov-
ernment functions, they would not be liable for failure to pro-
vide these services.5
Eight years later, in Frankfort Variety, Inc. v. City of
Frankfort,55 the Court reaffirmed its adherence to the duty
48 Id. (quoting Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618, 625 (Wis. 1962).
The Court also applied the Haney rule in City of Louisville v. Chapman, 413 S.W.2d
74 (Ky. 1967), which involved a wrongful death action arising out of a collision be-
tween a police cruiser and the decedent's car. Refusing to hold the city immune from
liability, the Court suggested that the city obtain liability insurance. Id. at 77.
" 433 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. 1968).
433 S.W.2d at 643.
51 Id.
52 Id. The Court also applied the Louisville Seed "singled out" theory of liability
in City of Lexington v. Yank, 431 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. 1968), where the city was held
liable for a police officer's excessive use of force in making an arrest, and in Fryar v.
Stovall, 504 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1974), where the city was held liable for an accident
resulting from a police officer's negligent directing of traffic.
-- 440 S.W.2d 269 (Ky. 1969).
54 Id. at 271.
0 552 S.W.2d 653 (Ky. 1977).
1979-19801
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theory. Judge Sternberg explained:
The nonliability of a city does not rest on the doctrine of
governmental immunity. As in the instance of a private indi-
vidual, a city is answerable for a breach of duty. However, a
city's relationship to individuals and to the public is not the
same as if the city were a private individual or corporation,
and its duties are not the same. When it undertakes mea-
sures for the protection of its citizens, it is not to be held to
the same standards of performance .... If it were, it very
well might hesitate to undertake them."8
The following year, in Richmond v. Louisville and Jeffer-
son County Metropolitan Sewer District,7 the court of ap-
peals apparently retreated from the duty theory. In that case,
a fourteen year old boy drowned in an allegedly defectively
designed and constructed drainage culvert. In affirming a
summary judgment in favor of the sewer district, the court
first noted that: "[tihe law concerning municipal immunity is
influx [sic], and recent opinions have not been totally consis-
tent."'58 The court mentioned the duty theory espoused in
Greer and Frankfort Variety, but chose instead to apply the
Louisville Seed Co. doctrine.59 Thus, because it had not sin-
gled out the boy from the general public and dealt with him
on a personal basis, the sewer district was not liable for his
death.
B. Recent Cases
In the aftermath of the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire the
Kentucky Supreme Court again confronted the problem of
municipal liability. In Grogan v. Commonwealth0 the city of
Southgate was sued for alleged negligence in failure to enforce
a local building code ordinance. The Supreme Court forcefully
asserted that, as it had explained in Frankfort Variety, a city
is totally different from an individual or private corporation
51 Id. at 655.
57 572 S.W.2d 601 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
Il Id. at 603.
9 Id. at 604. See notes 49-52 supra and accompanying text for discussion of the
Louisville Seed Co. doctrine.
60 577 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. 1979).
[Vol. 68
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and should not be held to a normal duty standard for tort
liability. The Court relied on Greer for authority that the fail-
ure of a city employee to perform a governmental function,
such as enforcing a city ordinance, did not breach a duty owed
to any individual. After emphasizing that Haney, in abolish-
ing municipal immunity, had created no "new" torts, the
Court explained that the existence of sovereign immunity had
"served to prevent a normal development of common-law tort
principles in the field of municipal liability. . . [and that] a
ready-made suit of clothes borrowed from the law of torts as
it applies to individuals and private corporations [would not
fit]. They simply are not the same animals."61
Despite its willingness to embrace the "duty" approach to
municipal liability, the Court based its decision on a public
policy analysis since "a legal problem of this magnitude
should not be resolved by the tricks of mechanical logic. The
answer must find its source in conscious public policy. - . .
[T]he fundamental policy-viewpoint ... since Haney v.
City of Lexington... is that a government ought to be free
to enact laws for the public protection without thereby ex-
posing its supporting taxpayers... to liability for failures
of omission in its attempt to enforce them. It is better to
have such laws, even haphazardly enforced, than not to have
them at all 63
The Court's refusal to resolve the case by mouthing the
magic words "the city has no duty" is a step in the proper
direction. As Dean Prosser stated:
[T]he statement that there is or is not a duty begs the essen-
tial question-whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled
to legal protection against the defendant's conduct. It is
therefore not surprising to find that the problem of duty is
as broad as the whole law of negligence, and that no univer-
sal test for it ever has been formulated. It is a shorthand
statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in
itself .... But it should be recognized that "duty" is not
sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total
61 Id. at 5.
" Id. at 6.
63 Id.
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of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say
that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection."
Such an approach, however, would necessitate frequent deci-
sions by the Kentucky Supreme Court since new questions of
policy cannot be determined conclusively by the lower courts.
The most recent appellate court excursion into municipal
liability was Brown v. City of Louisville.65 In Brown, the city
was sued for negligence when its police set fire to a tavern
while using tear gas to flush out a gunman who was barricaded
in the tavern. The majority of the court used the Louisville
Seed Co. "singled out" theory to determine whether the city
owed the tavern owner a duty to protect his property on a
personal basis. Since the police officer's actions in attempting
to subdue the gunman affected the general public and not
simply the tavern owner, the city as a matter of law was not
liable for the damages to the tavern."' In his dissent, Judge
Wilhoit advocated a nonfeasance/misfeasance test. Under this
theory the "singled out" theory would apply only where the
harm was caused by the city's failure to act. When the city
was actively negligent, as Judge Wilhoit argued was the case
in Brown, the city would be liable as would an individual
under the Haney theory.
7
Given the Supreme Court's strong adherence to the duty
theory in Frankfort Variety and Grogan, one may question
the court of appeals' failure to apply the theory in Brown and
Richmond. Possibly the court believed that the duty theory
did not provide a sufficiently precise standard with which to
evaluate municipal liability. The Louisville Seed Co. "singled
out" theory has the advantage of providing a factual standard
against which liability can be measured. In light of Grogan
and Frankfort Variety, however, it seems clear that the Su-
preme Court will not hold a municipality, even in a misfea-
sance case, to the private individual or corporation standard.
At the present time, the state of municipal liability is "in
6 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 325-26 (4th ed. 1971)
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
65 585 S.W.2d 428 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
e Id. at 430.
67 Id. at 430-31. (Wilhoit, J., dissenting).
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flux." When the Supreme Court stated in Grogan that sover-
eign immunity had prevented the normal development of the
common law in this area, i.t signaled that such development
would continue. In future years, or until the General Assem-
bly acts to clarify the area, changes will continue to evolve in
a case-by-case manner.
IV. THE Parker v. Redden RuLE OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE
In 1967, Parker v. Redden"8 split the defense of assump-
tion of the risk into two parts, which were labelled "pure" and
"qualified." The Court abolished the pure form as a defense
and incorporated the qualified form into an enlarged doctrine
of contributory negligence. In two recent cases, 9 the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals expanded the application of the
Parker rule and attempted to reanalyze it in an effort to elim-
inate the confusion encountered in its application. This sec-
tion will reexamine the Parker rule and explore its recent ju-
dicial transformation.
A. Parker v. Redden
Parker evolved from a three-car collision. After Redden
had stopped his car to assist Melton with a flat tire, a third
car, owned by Parker, rammed Melton's vehicle, driving it
into Redden's car and injuring Redden when he was caught
between his car and Melton's car. One issue before the Court
was whether Redden had assumed the risk of injury when he
stopped to help Melton fix the flat and saw that she was not
attempting to "flag" on-coming traffic.
70
The Court analyzed assumption of the risk, concluding
that the doctrine consisted of two parts, pure and qualified. 1
Pure assumption of the risk operated to bar "recovery by the
plaintiff who, aware of a risk already created by the negli-
68 421 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967).
" Rueff v. Investor Associates, Inc., 571 S.W.2d 93 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Sharp v.
McCabe Powers Body Co., No. 76-441 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1978).
70 421 S.W.2d at 588-90.
71 421 S.W.2d at 591. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 67
(4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 466, 496A-G (1965).
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gence of the defendant, [proceeds] voluntarily to encounter
it"72 regardless of whether his conduct was reasonable. Quali-
fied assumption of the risk, on the other hand, bars recovery
by the plaintiff only if his exposure of himself to the risk cre-
ated by the defendant's prior negligence was unreasonable. 3
The Court also compared qualified assumption of the risk
with ordinary contributory negligence, noting that both were
based on a "reasonable person" standard but that qualified
assumption of the risk would bar a plaintiff in some instances
where contributory negligence would not. For example, while
contributory negligence would not bar a negligent plaintiff
from a recovery when the defendant was grossly negligent,
qualified assumption of the risk would bar recovery. After
drawing these distinctions, the Court abolished pure assump-
tion of the risk as a defense "because reasonableness of con-
duct should be the basic consideration in all negligence
cases.M
4
Having eliminated one half of the doctrine, the Court
broadened contributory negligence by incorporating in its
scope the qualified assumption of the risk doctrine. Contribu-
tory negligence in Kentucky thus became bifurcated: one half
consisting of unreasonable conduct in any situation; the other
of an unreasonable voluntary exposure to a known risk cre-
ated by another's negligence. The first part was purely objec-
tive; the second was subjective to the extent it depended on a
plaintiff's awareness of the risk.7 5 The barring effect of con-
tributory negligence was also expanded. For example, it now
barred recovery by a plaintiff who negligently exposed himself
to a risk created by a grossly negligent defendant.
The Court, however, fearing that the abolition of pure as-
sumption of the risk would allow "a plaintiff to recover where
no concept of fault would warrant his recovery,176 limited the
treatment of traditional assumption of the risk situations in
72 421 S.W.2d at 591 (emphasis in original); see also RESTATEBENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 496 (1965).
73 421 S.W.2d at 591. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 466 (1965)(contrib-
utory negligence).
74 421 S.W.2d at 592.
75 This duality is illustrated by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 466 (1985).
76 421 S.W.2d at 592.
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contributory negligence contexts. Under this limitation, a
plaintiff would be found contributorily negligent as a matter
of law if "there was no substantial necessity or urgency for the
plaintiff's subjecting himself to the risk, or if the risk was one
that easily could have been eliminated before the plaintiff
took action .... ,,7" Conversely, "if there was an urgent ne-
cessity for the plaintiff to incur the risk, such as to save a life,
and if the risk could not easily have been eliminated, there is
no reason why the damage suffered by the plaintiff should be
borne by him rather than the defendant who negligently cre-
ated the risk. '78 This is the necessity-ease of elimination stan-
dard that will be discussed subsequently.
In applying its new rule of contributory negligence to
Parker, the Court stated that Redden had a "justifiable rea-
son" for confronting the risk since "[h]e was a Good Samari-
tan aiding a lady in distress ... . 17 The Court concluded
that Redden had not confronted unreasonably the known risk
created by Melton's prior negligent acts and was not, as a
matter of law, contributorily negligent. Therefore, the ques-
tion of whether Redden had acted reasonably in stopping to
assist Melton in fixing a flat tire on a country road at night
and in confronting the risk she created by not flagging ap-
proaching cars, was a question of fact for the jury.
B. The Rule and its Application
1. Threshold Requirements
Although the Parker Court incorporated qualified as-
sumption of the risk into contributory negligence, it did not
abolish the traditional requirements for presentation of an as-
sumption of the risk defense. Before the Parker rule can be
applied, therefore, two threshold elements must exist. First,
the risk confronted by the plaintiff must be created prior to
the plaintiff's action.80 In Haert v. Stanberg,81 for example,
7 Id. at 593 (emphasis added).
78 Id. (emphasis added).
79 Id.
80 Haert v. Stanberg, 479 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1972).
8, Id. at 590.
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the Court reversed the trial court's finding that the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law under Parker,
where the defendant's negligence in creating the risk occurred
after the plaintiff had begun to act. Secondly, the plaintiff
must be aware of the risk before acting."2 For example, in
Bryant v. Conrad"s the Court held that the Parker rule of
contributory negligence would not bar the plaintiff's suit
where the plaintiff was unaware that the defendant's em-
ployee had removed the "chock blocks" holding logs on a
truck and was thus unaware of the risk in walking behind the
truck.
The two threshold elements of the Parker rule serve as
signposts for the trial judge, directing him toward application
of the correct element of the contributory negligence duality."
Where the defendant's negligence did not create a prior risk
or where a plaintiff was unaware of the risk, the trial judge
should evaluate the plaintiff's conduct in light of the ususal
reasonable person contributory negligence standard; this rea-
sonableness will usually be a question of fact.5 5 Where, on the
other hand, the defendant created a prior risk of which the
plaintiff was aware, the trial judge should apply the Parker
rule.
"I McCormick v. Gullett, 460 S.W.2d 813 (Ky. 1970) (plaintiff did not know of
the risk created by over-stacking hay on a truck); Cassidy v. Fertig, 438 S.W.2d 346
(Ky. 1969) (plaintiff was not aware that the defendant was on top of unsupported
"floating wall"); Bryant v. Conrad, 420 S.W.2d 666 (Ky. 1967) (plaintiff was not
aware that defendant's employee had removed "chock blocks" holding logs on truck);
Adams v. Crandall, 418 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1967) (plaintiff was not aware that a usually
docile cow was agitated by attempts to rope her).
83 420 S.W.2d 666 (Ky. 1967).
84 In two cases involving hay-hauling accidents, Roberts v. Davis, 422 S.W.2d 890
(Ky. 1967) and Gullett v. McCormick, 421 S.W.2d 352 (Ky. 1967), the Court did not
seem to require that the threshold elements be present before it applied the Parker
rule. This deviation is due, perhaps, in part to the newness of the Parker rule when
the cases were decided. Subsequent cases have tried to harmonize Roberts and Gul-
lett with the requirements of the Parker rule. In Barnett v. Hendrix, 442 S.W.2d 312
(Ky. 1969), the Court distinguished Roberts, noting that the plaintiff was not aware
of the defendant's negligence. The Court in McCormick v. Gullett, 460 S.W.2d 813,
815 (Ky. 1970), explained the earlier Gullett decision, stating that the plaintiff in the
case was unaware of the danger.
" Cassidy v. Fertig, 438 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. 1969); Bryant v. Conrad, 420 S.W.2d
666 (Ky. 1967); Adams v. Crandall, 418 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1967).
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2. The Parker Rule in Application
As explained above, the Parker rule provides that when a
plaintiff voluntarily confronts a known risk created by the de-
fendant's prior negligence, the plaintiff may recover from the
defendant for an injury only if the plaintiff acted reasonably
in facing that risk.86 Cases that have applied the rule give
some indication of the operation of the necessity-ease of elimi-
nation standard. In Parker, the plaintiff was acting as a "good
samaritan" when he stopped to help a lone woman fix a flat
tire at night on a country road. The Court held this act was
sufficiently "necessary" to not be determined unreasonable as
a matter of law. In Armes v. Armes,s? the Court found that
two women were not acting unreasonably as a matter of law
when they were injured while helping to start a stalled truck
on a country road, since the two were "marooned . . . miles
from home on a winter night with a two month old child, with
no other means at hand or easily obtainable to return them to
their homes."8 These two cases depict a "substantial" degree
of necessity.
Conversely, other cases have demonstrated a degree of
necessity below that standard. In Crush v. Kaelin,89 the plain-
tiff, a carpenter by trade, was injured while working on a scaf-
fold which he knew was constructed improperly. The Court
found the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law
under the Parker rule, when he failed to demonstrate a sub-
stantial necessity for proceeding in face of the risk. In
Houchin v. Willow Avenue Realty Co.,90 the Court held that
the plaintiff, who had known for two weeks that a stairway
light was burned out, was contributorily negligent as a matter
of law when she fell down the stairway in a descent to do her
laundry. The Court noted that the necessity to wash was min-
imal and the ease of getting a flashlight to eliminate the risk
11 Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586, 592-93 (Ky. 1967).
87 424 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1967).
8 424 S.W.2d at 140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 466 (1965) (exam-
ple given concerns the saving of lives).
89 419 S.W.2d 142 (Ky. 1967).
90 453 S.W.2d 560 (Ky. 1970).
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was obvious.91
Two recent court of appeals cases also have been instruc-
tive. In Dade Park Jockey Club v. Minton,2 the court held
the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law when
she fell on a sand-covered ramp at a race track, because hav-
ing previously slipped, she knew it was slippery and could
have easily used other ramps. Mere inconvenience was not a
sufficient "necessity". In the second case, Fuhs v. Ryan,03 the
plaintiff was stranded in her apartment by the ice covered
stairway between her apartment and the parking lot. When
ordered to report to work she chanced utilization of the stair-
way and fell. In a split decision, the court of appeals held that
the plaintiff was not, as a matter of law, contributorily negli-
gent since it was unclear whether the necessity prompting her
to face the risk was "substantial".
The Fuhs court's decision that contributory negligence
was a question of fact when the sufficiency of the necessity to
face the risk was unclear was foreshadowed by both Crush
and Houchin. In Crush the Court implied that proof of eco-
nomic necessity might be sufficient to avoid a directed verdict
on the necessity issue,94 while the Houchin Court stated that
the issue of contributory negligence should go to the trier of
the fact if the existence of necessity was unclear.95
Kentucky case law since Parker has established a contin-
uum for the application of Parker's necessity-ease of elimina-
tion standard. At one pole lies a real risk of serious physical
harm; at the other lies mere inconvenience or commonplace
activities. In the middle, yet to be precisely placed, is eco-
nomic compulsion. Whatever the standard, the Parker rule of
contributory negligence requires a plaintiff to satisfy the ne-
cessity-ease of elimination standard to avert a summary judg-
ment or directed verdict. 6
91 Id. at 563.
.2 550 S.W.2d 188 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
11 571 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
94 419 S.W.2d at 143.
91 453 S.W.2d at 563.
96 Even if the necessity-ease of elimination hurdle is surmounted by a plaintiff
and a directed verdict avoided, an instruction that the reasonableness of plaintiff's
conduct must be measured in light of necessity and ease of risk elimination would be
[Vol. 68
SURVEY-TORTS
C. Recent Developments
1. Rueff v. Investor Associates Inc.-A Misstep?
In recent decisions, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has
taken the opportunity to attempt clarification of the Parker
rule and to expand its application. In Rueff v. Investor Associ-
ates, Inc., 7 Rueff brought an action against the owner of an
apartment complex where he fell and broke his ankle while
attempting to descend a stairway. The defendant asserted
that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in utilizing the
stairway. The trial court granted summary judgment for the
defendant.
In reversing, the court of appeals noted that the defen-
dants had relied on Parker for the proposition that a plaintiff
is contributorily negligent as a matter of law unless there is
substantial necessity or urgency for confronting a known risk
created by the defendant. The court disagreed and held that
under Parker, necessity and urgency "are not the controlling
elements in determining contributory negligence; they are
merely factors to be considered in ascertaining the reasonable-
ness of plaintiff's conduct, which is the ultimate question."9 8
Since it was unable to conclude that Rueff's attempt to de-
scend the stairway in the dark was, as a matter of law, unrea-
sonable, the court held that the issue should have gone to the
jury.
Although the Rueff court discussed the Parker rule, it
failed to apply the rule correctly. Instead, the court merely
concluded that, "unless reasonable minds could not differ,"
the issue of contributory negligence was for the jury. There
was no discussion of weighing the necessity or urgency for de-
scending the stairway or mention of the feasibility of elimina-
tion of the risk. Were there other stairs the plaintiff could
have used? Could he have gotten a flashlight? The Rueff court
failed to indicate whether any such evidence had been
produced.
proper. Wooten v. White Trucks, 514 F.2d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 1975).
'1 571 S.W.2d 93 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
9s Id. at 95.
99 Id.
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The Rueff court's failure to require the plaintiff to pro-
duce evidence of the necessity to confront the risk and inabil-
ity to easily eliminate it undercut a policy objective of the
Parker rule. The necessity-ease of elimination standard pro-
pounded in Parker was intended to screen out unwarranted
plaintiffs by requiring the plaintiff to produce such evidence
or suffer a directed verdict. Implicit in the Rueff court's fail-
ure to demand this production is the requirement that the de-
fendant produce evidence to indicate either a lack of necessity
for the plaintiff's conduct or ease of risk elimination before
obtaining a directed verdict. Thus, the court undercut the pol-
icy of preventing unwarranted recovery as adopted in Parker.
2. Application of the Parker Rule in Products Liability
Cases
The court of appeals, in Sharp v. McCabe Powers Body,
Co.,100 recently extended the application of the Parker rule.
Although the court merely utilized the necessity-ease of elimi-
nation standard mandated by Parker,'0' the decision is signifi-
cant as the first Kentucky case to apply the Parker rule of
contributory negligence in a products liability context. 0 2
In Sharp, the plaintiff, an electrician for the Kentucky
Department of Highways, was injured when he fell from an
aerial boom which was not equipped with a safety belt. In his
action against McCabe Powers Body Co., the manufacturer of
100 No. 76-441 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1978), rev'd on other grounds, No. 78-SC-
599-DG (Ky. Feb. 12, 1980).
10' The court stated:
There was evidence that safety belts were not readily available for purchase
and that appellant was aware of a request for one from his employer with
no results. We feel reasonable minds could differ as to appellant's ac-
tions-whether to risk the danger of operating an aerial boom without a
belt or perhaps risk losing his job if he failed to operate the machinery
when belts were not issued by the state or used by other workers operating
similar equipment.
Id. at 4.
102 This absence of precedent was noted in Wooten v. White Trucks, 514 F.2d
634 (5th Cir. 1975). There the Fifth Circuit, applying Kentucky law, assumed that
Kentucky would not "discriminate as to defenses according to theories of defendant's
liability. . . ." Id. at 639. The court of appeals decision in Sharp confirms the Fifth
Circuit's assumption.
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the boom, the plaintiff alleged negligence, strict liability for
defective design, and breach of implied warranty. McCabe
Powers contended that Sharp had been aware of the need for
a safety belt and was, therefore, contributorily negligent as a
matter of law.10 3 The trial court accepted the defendant's con-
tentions and directed a verdict for McCabe Powers. The court
of appeals reversed. In its analysis the court examined the is-
sue of reasonableness in light of the Parker rule, but refused
to find for the defendant as a matter of law. Instead, the court
ruled that the plaintiff had presented enough evidence to cre-
ate a jury question.'
04
In discussing the plaintiff's strict liability claim for defec-
tive design, the court explained its application of the Parker
rule to the case by noting that Kentucky had adopted § 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as its standard in defec-
tive design cases and that comment n to § 402A made "the
form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily
and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger
a defense under [that] section . . . . ,1 The Court held
"the same principles applicable" to contributory negligence
under strict liability as stated in the court's analysis of "ordi-
nary negligence." 06
The application of the Parker rule was not surprising be-
cause most jurisdictions recognize some similar defense in
product liability actions. 07 Since Kentucky has recently in-
cluded "failure to exercise ordinary care" as a defense to
product liability actions in its new products liability legisla-
tion, 08 Sharp would seem to add the Parker rule to that de-
fense, even though the statutory language does not expressly
embrace the old assumption of the risk situation.
On February 12, 1980 the Kentucky Supreme Court re-
103 No. 76-441, slip op. at 1-3.
101 Id. at 4.
"05 No. 76-441, slip op. at 5-6 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
comment n (1965)).
106 Id. at 6.
107 See Annot., 46 A.L.R.3rd 240, 253-56 (1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A, comment n (1965).
108 KRS § 411.320(3)(Supp. 1978).
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versed the court of appeals decision in Sharp,108 holding that
"where a product is manufactured according to plans and
specifications furnished by the buyer and the alleged defect is
open and obvious, the manufacturer is protected from liability
for injuries occasioned by use of the product."110 In reaching
its decision the Court did not consider the application of the
Parker rule in products liability cases, rather it concluded
that "this case is entirely different from the classic products
liability case due to the added factor of design according to
the buyer's specifications." ' Thus it is unclear how the Ken-
tucky Court will apply the Parker rule in products liability
cases not involving a design specification, although the Court
should adopt the position taken by the court of appeals in
Sharp.
19 No. 78-SC-599-DG (Ky. Feb. 12, 1980).
110 Id. at 6.
I Id. at 5.
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